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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF APPLICABLE COURT RULES
Plaintiffs submit that the following supplemental court
rules are applicable and relevant.
Rule 2.7(e) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, 1983 Replacement,
provides:
"(e) Affidavits not filed within the time required
by any Rule of Civil Procedure shall not be received
except on stipulation of the parties or for good cause
shown." [Emphasis supplied.]
Rule 4-103(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
not effective until on or after October 30, 1988, provides:
"(A) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring

written notice shall be heard only after written notice
served no less than five (5) days prior to the date
specified in the notice for hearing, unless the Court for
good cause shown orders the period of time for notice of
hearing shortened,
"(B) Documents in support of law and motion matters,
including returns of service on supplemental orders and
bench warrants, must be filed in the Clerk's office at
least two days before the hearing on the matter.
"(C) Proceedings based upon supporting documents
which are not filed in accordance with this rule may be
dismissed," [Emphasis supplied.]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is no question but that dismissal of plaintiffs1
action based on Utah's four year statute of limitations was in
error.

Since the error is plain, this Court has full power not

only to order a one day extension of time to appeal but also to
reverse the order of dismissal.
The district court had before it proferred facts upon which
a one day extension should have been granted.
abused its discretion in not doing so.

The district court

Alternatively, the

district court erred in not permitting the plaintiff Walter Park
Larson, who had driven from California in order to personally
appear at the hearing on the motion, to present any concrete
evidence as to either his reasons for filing an appeal one day
late or his reasons for not having filed an affidavit in suppport
of his pro se motion for a one day extension.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ERROR OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS'
AMENDED COMPLAINT IS PLAIN AND CLEAR. THIS COURT HAS FULL
POWER NOT ONLY TO REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT ON THE EXTENSION
OF TIME ISSUE BUT ON THE DISMISSAL ISSUE AS WELL.
Two things are clear about this appeal.
The first is that Judge Frederick dismissed plaintiffs'

amended complaint in error; the second is that unless this court
intervenes, as it has full power to do, these plaintiffs will not
have their claims litigated, notwithstanding the clear error
which occurred below.
Without restating the argument on the dismissal issue
contained in plaintiffs' opening brief, plaintiff notes that the
amended complaint alleges breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment and conversion, among other matters.

The affidavit of

Walter Park Larson states that the assets subject to these
allegations were intact as of a date within four years' prior to
the filing of plaintiff's original complaint (R. 50, Add. 3).
This affidavit creates a clear issue of fact which precludes
dismissal of plaintiffs' suit on grounds of Utah's four year
statute of limitations.

And, as stated in plaintiff's opening

brief, there is no evidence in the record to support defendants'
conclusion that the plan of reorganization repudiates the
contract in question, since the plan itself was never put into
the record of these proceedings.
Judge Frederick granted defendants' motion most likely
because he did not read Mr. Larson's affidavit.

3

The affidavit of

Peter Waldo, prior counsel to plaintiffs, states:
"During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss,
I was asked by the Court whether I had filed an
Affidavit on behalf of my client in opposition to
the Motion. I answered the Court no I had not filed
an Affidavit, however, an Affidavit was filed by
the Larson's previous counsel in opposition to the
Motion" (R. 88, Add. 7).
If he had read the affidavit, there is no question but that
Judge Frederick would have denied the motion.
Plaintiffs submit that this court has full power not only to
reverse the district court on the extension issue but on the
dismissal issue as well, notwithstanding defendants1 citation to
Reese Enter., Inc. v. Lawson, 220 Kan. 300, 553 P. 2d 885, 899
(Kan. 1976).

Kansas appellate court rules apparently require

assignments of error.

Plaintiffs are aware of no ruling by this

court equating the docketing statement with assignments of error
as used in Kansas.
Moreoever, this court has full power to recognize and remedy
plain errors "even though such errors were not raised or were not
properly raised by the parties," just as the federal courts do.
Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 361, 32 Am Jur 2d 845. In
this case, prior counsel did not include the dismissal issue in
the docketing statement on this appeal because that issue was
already the subject of a separate appeal.

Judicial economy

justifies eliminating a second appeal to address the issue of the
dismissal, in the event of reversal on the extension of time
issue.
The pivotal issues then become should this court intervene,

and if so, in what manner.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD INTERVENE AND FIND REVERSIBLE ERROR
SO THAT PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS CAN BE HEARD.
A.

The District Court committed reversible error in
refusing to grant a one day extension of time to
appeal based on the record it had before it.

Not having been present at the proceedings below,
undersigned counsel must defer to the conclusion of defendants1
counsel that the September 13, 1988 Affidavit of Walter Park
Larson (R. 93-95, Add. 10) was not presented to Judge Frederick
(Resp. Br. 6). Indeed, Judge Frederick did not have the
information contained in that affidavit because he refused to
receive it. That refusal itself was error, as is argued below.
But the District Court did have before it a detailed factual
statement in the form of a pro se Notice of Extension of Time to
Appeal and a pro se Notice of Appeal, both of which included
these proferred facts:
1.

That plaintiffs had received no notice of entry of

judgment;
2.

That plaintiffs were moving to California and had been

out of state from July through the date of the Notice of Appeal;
3.

That plaintiffs had communicated to their attorney that

they wished to appeal;
4.

That plaintiffs1 attorney had stated that he would

appeal or move for a rehearing (R. 75-76, Add. 5).
There is nothing in the record to show any objection by

R

defendants to these facts proferred.

These facts, coupled with

the obvious fact that plaintiffs filed a pro se notice of appeal
immediately upon learning that the time to appeal had run,
support the conclusion that the district court erred in not
granting plaintiffs a one day extension.
In responding to plaintiffs1 opening brief, defendants do
not respond to plaintiff's citation of In re Buckingham Super
Markets, Inc. , 631 F. 2d 763 (D. C. C. A., 1980), in which
excusable neglect was found from confusion over which counsel
would file the appeal.

Therein the court stated that the

"excusable neglect standard has been applied with diminishing
rigidity" and extensions "are available upon the proper showing."
631 F. 2d at 765.

Plaintiffs made such a showing and should have

received an extension, particularly in light of the lack of any
Rule 58A(d) notice of entry of the order of dismissal.
B.

The District Court committed reversible error in
denying to plaintiffs the opportunity to justify
their request for a one day extension.

The only record available of what transpired below is the
September 13, 1988 Affidavit of Mr. Larson in which he explains
that after having driven all the way from California for the
hearing, he "was not allowed to speak." (R. 95, Add. 10). '

As

1/Undersigned counsel has no more first hand knowledge of what
transpired below than this Court does since he did not appear
until. Undersigned counsel has called Judge Frederick's
court reporter only to be informed that no transcript was
made of either the hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss, or
of the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to
appeal.

is apparent from his affidavit, Mr. Larson had many more detailed
reasons, not considered by the court, for which the notice of
appeal was filed one day late, several of which include severe
family illnesses and hardships.

Yet none of this was considered

by the court because Mr. Larson was not permitted to talk.

This

was reversible error.
In so stating, plaintiffs recognize that the applicable
rules require submission of affidavits prior to hearing.
However, Rule 2.7(e) of the Rules of Practice, in effect at the
time of this hearing, '

expressly provides for the waiver of

the affidavit requirement for "good cause shown."

These

plaintiffs were not permitted to show good cause for anything
because Mr. Larson was not permitted to speak.

This was error.

Plaintiffs concede that the customary standard of review for
a lower court's decision on a motion for extension of time to
appeal is abuse of discretion (Resp. Br. 7-8). However, the
lower court must, at a minimum, provide an opportunity to show
good cause.

In this case, that means, at a minimum, the

opportunity to explain the unavailability of a supporting
affidavit.
On many occasions, this court has made its feelings clear
on the affidavit issue in the context of a motion for summary
2/ The Utah Code of Judicial Administration version of this rule
was not effective until on or after October 30, 1988, which is
after the hearings were held in this case. Nevertheless,
plaintiffs submit that these new rules require the same
result.

judgment,

cf. inter alia, Strand v. Associated Students of

University of Utah, 561 P. 2d 191 (Ut., 1977);
678 P. 2d 311 (Ut., 1984).

Cox v_._ Winters,

On such occasions, the court has

found an abuse of discretion where the district court granted
summary judgment over a request for an additional opportunity to
state facts in opposition to the motion.

Ibid.

In this case, the district court erred precisely because Mr.
Larson, who had come from California for the hearing after having
proceeded pro se as best he could, was denied the opportunity to
explain anything.

Therefore, at a minimum, this court should

remand these proceedings to Judge Frederick to afford to the
plaintiffs an opportunity to show good cause for the filing of
their appeal, one day late.
Finally, plaintiffs note that respondents repeatedly
attribute the failure to file a timely appeal to the lack of
diligence of plaintiffs1 prior counsel.

Yet defendants

themselves remain remiss in not providing to plaintiffs a Rule
58A(d) notice of entry of judgment.

This omission should

definitely be considered by the court in making its decision on
plaintiffs1 appeal, otherwise there is no purpose or intent
to Rule 58A(d) and this court might as well order it erased from
the Code of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the District Court, grant
plaintiffs1 motion for an extension of time to appeal, and, at
the same time, reverse the order of dismissal of the District
8

Court.

Alternatively, this Court remand this case to the

District Court with instructions to take and consider plaintiffs'
evidence as to their reasons for filing a notice of appeal one
day late.
DATED this

\^

day of October, 1989

L. Edward Robbins
Attorney for Plaintiffs/
Appellants
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